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STATE v. ALLEN: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
RIGHT TO BE SECURE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND MONTANA’S
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Stephanie Holstein*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Supreme Court recently examined whether Montanans
have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy on the telephone in
the electronic monitoring and search and seizure case State v. Allen.1 In
general, both the United States and Montana Constitutions provide the right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Yet conflicting
authority, varying standards, and fact-intensive cases make the determination of whether police practices infringe upon this right a formidable task.
Indeed, “[n]o area of the law has more bedeviled the judiciary . . . .”3 Facing this challenge in Allen, the Court employed a privacy-enhanced search
analysis under the Montana Constitution and overruled thirty years of precedent favoring warrantless electronic monitoring.4 Allen represents an important expansion of protection for Montanans, exemplifies the complexity
of search analysis, and highlights the significant connection between the
right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures and Montana’s
individual right of privacy.
This note begins with an overview of the privacy and search protections afforded by the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution as well as a history of relevant federal and state caselaw. Next, the
note discusses the Allen decision, where the Montana Supreme Court held
that despite informant consent, warrantless electronic monitoring of a telephone conversation by law enforcement constitutes an unlawful search prohibited by the Montana Constitution.5 Additionally, the note analyzes how
the Court’s pivotal decision in Allen aligns with key precedent, does not
greatly impair law enforcement, and accurately reflects Montana’s constitu* Stephanie Holstein (née Hanna), candidate for J.D. 2013, University of Montana School of
Law. The author specially thanks her husband, Doug, and daughters, Moxie and Zell, for their love and
support. The author offers additional thanks to the staff and editors of the Montana Law Review and
Michel Fullerton for their invaluable input throughout the development of this note.
1. State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010).
2. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.
3. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: “The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run
Smooth”, 1966 U. Ill. L. Forum 255, 255.
4. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1060–1061.
5. Id. at 1061.
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tional values and goals. Finally, the note addresses Justice Nelson’s special
concurring opinion, which advocates for a new approach to search analysis
in Montana.
II. DISCUSSION

OF THE

LAW PRIOR

TO

STATE V. ALLEN

A. The Right to Be Secure from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
and the Right of Privacy in the United States
and Montana Constitutions
Over the last century, the protection of individual rights has migrated
from the federal arena to the domain of the fifty states. Originally, a defendant in state court did not possess the rights bestowed by the federal Constitution because the Constitution governed only federal courts.6 In 1937,
however, the United States Supreme Court responded to abuses by state
governments by applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states.7 The Court required the states to enforce those constitutional pledges that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . .”8
One such pledge was the Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable
searches and seizures.9 By the close of the 1960s, the Court had bound the
states to almost all of the restraints found in the Bill of Rights.10 Thereafter, the Court’s expansion of this “federal floor of protection”11 subsided as
it began to limit individual liberties under the federal Constitution.12 Yet,
“our federalism permits state courts to provide greater protection to individual . . . liberties if they wish to do so,”13 and if a state decision is based on
“separate, adequate, and independent grounds,” the Supreme Court will not
disturb the decision.14 Thus in the face of federal withdrawal, state courts
6. James H. Goetz, Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes
Erratic, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 289, 294 (1990).
7. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 537–538 (1986).
8. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
9. Brennan, supra n. 7, at 539.
10. Id. at 540. The exclusionary rule was also incorporated onto the states during this time. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The exclusionary rule is an extension of the Fourth Amendment deeming evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure inadmissible in court.
11. Brennan, supra n. 7, at 550.
12. Id. at 547. Brennan chronicles a series of decisions that “reveal most plainly that [federal]
retrenchment is following the Warren era.” Among the Court’s rights-limiting decisions, he lists “that
we do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in our bank records . . . ; that private diaries may be
seized and utilized to convict a person of a crime; [and] that police searches are lawful when grounded
on consent even if that consent is not a knowing or intelligent one . . . .” Id.
13. Id. at 551.
14. Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
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have, as “coequal guardians of civil rights and liberties,”15 begun to fill the
gaps created by the decisions of the Supreme Court.16
The states are best situated to protect individual rights,17 particularly
when the federal Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right, such as
the right of privacy.18 The principle of an implicit, federal constitutional
right of privacy was first enunciated in 1928 in a dissent by Justice Brandeis. Brandeis deemed the right of privacy the very “principle underlying
the Fourth Amendment”19 and declared:
[The makers of our Constitution] . . . conferred . . . the right to be let alone—
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.20

In later cases, the Court held that privacy is a constitutional right, both in
terms of search and seizure21 and personal autonomy.22 Nevertheless, the
federal Constitution is intended to limit federal government, while state
constitutions grant affirmative rights.23 This dichotomy is inherent in the
United States’ dual constitutional system and illuminates why many states,
including Montana,24 expressly grant the right of privacy through their state
constitutions.
15. Brennan, supra n. 7, at 548.
16. Id. at 548–549. “Between 1970 and 1984, state courts, increasingly reluctant to follow the
federal lead, have handed down over 250 published opinions holding that the constitutional minimums
set by the United States Supreme Court were insufficient to satisfy the more stringent requirements of
state constitutional law.” Id. at 548.
17. States are best situated to protect individual rights because they can best accommodate their
own unique cultures; respect their differing constitutional histories; impose a more immediate local
authority; allow for the people to have a more direct influence; and provide expediency and finality in
dispute resolution. In addition, states can act as experimental legal laboratories and historically, state
constitutions provided the blueprint for the federal bills of rights. See Dorothy T. Beasley, Federalism
and the Protection of Individual Rights: The American State Constitutional Perspective, 11 Ga. St. U. L.
Rev. 681, 691–695 (1995).
18. Beasley, supra n. 17, at 698.
19. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part, Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
21. Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Mapp, 367 U.S. 643
(applying the exclusionary rule to the states, but reaffirming the right of privacy as “Wolf’s constitutional documentation of the right to privacy . . . .”).
22. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485–486 (1965).
23. Brennan, supra n. 7, at 549.
24. “From 1968 to 1990 ‘eight states amended their respective state constitutions to provide explicit
protection for a right of privacy.’” The states are Hawaii (twice), Illinois, South Carolina, Louisiana,
California, Montana, Alaska, and Florida. Washington and Arizona already had provisions protecting
the right to privacy.” Beasley, supra n. 17, at 699 (quoting John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights
Derived from Federal Sources, 3 Emerging Issues St. Const. L. 195, 210–212 (1990)).
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Montana ratified its current constitution in 1972. With its numerous
unique rights,25 it has been lauded as having a “declaration of rights [that]
provides perhaps the most stringent bulwark for the protection of individual
liberties of any in the nation.”26 Montana’s constitutional framers included
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in Article II, § 11,
which is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment.27 They also provided a
stand-alone right of privacy in Article II, § 10, which states: “The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”28 Convention delegates intended § 10 to guarantee Montana citizens “the right to
be let alone . . . the most important right of them all.”29
Montana’s historical and judicial records demonstrate that the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures should be interpreted in
conjunction with the right of privacy.30 Shortly after territorial recognition,
Montanans “vigorously asserted their independence” and demonstrated
their desire for Montana’s government to “guarantee security and allow for
the development of individuality.”31 After statehood, the Montana Supreme
Court enforced the common law “right to be let alone”32 through the search
and seizure provision of the 1889 Constitution,33 equating it to a safeguard
against “unnecessary or unauthorized invasion[s] of the right of privacy.”34
Until the 1972 Constitutional Convention, the Court upheld the principle
that the federal and state search and seizure provisions protect “persons and
their right to privacy.”35 Even during the Convention, “delegates clearly
contemplated that the right to privacy would shield Montana citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures.”36 Strong precedent supports the union
25. The Declaration of Rights in Article II of the Montana Constitution provides for the right to a
clean and healthful environment in section 3, the right to dignity in section 4, the right of participation in
section 8, and the right to know in section 9.
26. Goetz, supra n. 6, at 355.
27. Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.
28. Id. art. II, § 10.
29. Melissa Harrison & Peter Mickelson, The Evolution of Montana’s Privacy-Enhanced Search
and Seizure Analysis: A Return to First Principles, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2003).
30. Harrison & Mickelson, supra n. 29, at 247; Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons, Right of
Privacy, 48 Mont. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1987); William C. Rava, Toward a Historical Understanding of Montana’s Privacy Provision, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1681, 1700 (1998).
31. Rava, supra n. 30, at 1687.
32. Welsh v. Roehm, 241 P.2d 816, 819 (Mont. 1952).
33. Harrison & Mickelson, supra n. 29, at 247.
34. State ex rel. King v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., Missoula Co., 224 P. 862, 865 (Mont. 1924).
35. State v. Brecht, 485 P.2d 47, 50 (Mont. 1971), overruled, State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153 (Mont.
1985).
36. Harrison & Mickelson, supra n. 29, at 247.
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of §§ 10 and 11, and, when properly read together, they should provide
“robust protection”37 to Montanans against governmental intrusion.
B. Search and Privacy Rights in Federal and State Warrantless
Participant Monitoring Jurisprudence
Federal jurisprudence on warrantless participant monitoring demonstrates the United States Supreme Court’s fluctuating protection of federal
individual rights as well as a critical change in the focus of search and
seizure analysis from property to privacy.38 The Court decided its first warrantless participant monitoring case in 1952 in On Lee v. United States,
where the Court held that an agent eavesdropping on a conversation between an informant and the defendant via a transmitter device worn by the
informant “did not amount to an unlawful search . . . proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment.”39 The Court reasoned that neither the agent (standing
outside the defendant’s business) nor the informant (inside with consent of
the defendant) trespassed on the defendant’s property and, therefore, did not
violate the defendant’s rights.40 On Lee illustrates how the Court’s analysis
remained firmly entrenched in property concepts through the 1950s.
In the 1960s, the Court’s focus changed from property to privacy, resulting in increased Fourth Amendment protections. In Lopez v. United
States, where an IRS agent surreptitiously recorded a discussion with the
defendant, the Court concluded that the defendant had risked that his incriminating statements would be “accurately reproduced in court, whether
37. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1057.
38. There are two points that should be understood before considering the specifics of warrantless
participant monitoring. First, the Fourth Amendment protects the intangible, including conversations,
Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); but, it does not protect against the use of police informants,
Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966). Second, warrantless participant monitoring has a specific
definition within the realm of electronic surveillance. Electronic surveillance by police includes both
wiretapping and eavesdropping. Wiretapping is an interception between two points of communication,
while eavesdropping—the focus of this note—“involves a listening device on one end of the communication.” Nicholas Matlach, Who Let the Katz Out? How the ECPA and SCA Fail to Apply to Modern
Digital Communications and How Returning to the Principles in Katz v. United States Will Fix It, 18
CommLaw 421, 423 (2010). To eavesdrop, a consenting party (“participant” or “informant”) may record a conversation, use a device to transmit the conversation to a third party, or consent to a third
party’s use of a device to overhear. Kent Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 Colum. L.
Rev. 189, 190 n. 9 (1968).
39. On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952).
40. Id. at 751–753. The Court relied on the rule previously articulated in Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
466, and upheld in Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942), “that the Fourth Amendment is violated
only where there has been (1) a search and seizure of the defendant’s person, (2) a seizure of his papers
or his tangible material effects, or (3) an actual physical invasion of his house or curtilage for the
purpose of making a seizure,” overruled in part, Katz, 389 U.S. 347; see also Allen, 241 P.3d at 1065
(Nelson, J., specially concurring).
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by faultless memory or mechanical recording.”41 Although it found no unreasonable search, the Court’s exploration of how the defendant risked exposure of his private statements reveals a notable shift in its analysis from
property to privacy interests.42
In 1967, the Court decided the seminal search and seizure case, Katz v.
United States.43 In Katz, the Court found law enforcement officers violated
the Fourth Amendment by recording the defendant’s conversation in a telephone booth after attaching a device to the booth’s exterior.44 The Katz
opinion is pivotal for two reasons. First, the Court held the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,”45 fully supplanting search and seizure
analysis based on property with a privacy-based analysis. Second, Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion generated the two-part “Katz test.” A search
implicating the Fourth Amendment under this prevailing standard requires
“first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”46 Katz transformed search and seizure law by
establishing a heightened search standard reflective of privacy and holding
that electronic monitoring constitutes a search protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
Four years later, however, the Court narrowed Katz’s expansion by
holding that participant electronic monitoring is compatible with the Constitution. In United States v. White, agents listened to conversations between an informant and the defendant via a radio transmitter worn by the
informant.47 The Court applied both the Katz test and conflicting pre-Katz
law to conclude that electronic monitoring with one party’s consent is not
an unreasonable search.48 The Court reasoned that “one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to
the police,” and therefore, such an individual does not have a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.49 Thus pursuant to White,
warrantless participant monitoring remains legal under federal law.
Montana’s warrantless participant monitoring jurisprudence shows an
early adherence and recent return to expanded constitutional protections
against intrusive governmental practices. Initially after ratification of the
1972 Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court used the § 10 Right of Pri41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427, 430, 439 (1963).
Greenawalt, supra n. 38, at 196.
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 359.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–747 (1971) (plurality).
Id. at 752.
Id.
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vacy to close the gap in monitoring protections left by White. In State v.
Brackman, an informant transmitted a face-to-face conversation to police
via a device attached to his body.50 The Court concluded that White was
controlling, but the recording was nonetheless unreasonable under § 10 of
the Montana Constitution.51 The Court asserted: “A state is free as a matter
of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those
[held by] the United States Supreme Court.”52
But after its initial affirmation of Montana’s privacy guarantee, the
Court strayed in the 1980s and began to follow federal jurisprudence. First,
in the 1980-case State v. Hanley, where an undercover officer secretly recorded his telephone conversation with the defendant,53 the Court declined
to address the Montana Constitution in its analysis and ruled that the recording was permissible under both White and a federal statute regarding
the interception of communication.54 Then later that year, the Court applied
its Hanley reasoning in State v. Coleman and held: “Neither the Montana
nor the federal constitution prohibits [electronic] monitoring where one of
the participants consents.”55 Finally, in 1988 in State v. Brown, an informant surreptitiously recorded both his telephone and face-to-face conversations with the defendant.56 Fully overruling Brackman, the Court rendered
warrantless participant monitoring legitimate in Montana for the next
twenty years by upholding both the White rule (allowing monitoring of
face-to-face conversations) and the Coleman rule (allowing monitoring of
telephone conversations).57
The Court made one notable deviation during the 1980s. In State v.
Solis, an undercover officer secretly videotaped his face-to-face interactions
with the defendant.58 The Court factually distinguished Coleman as a telephone case and, after citing White, proclaimed: “This Court is not bound by
decisions of the United States Supreme Court where independent grounds
exist for reaching a contrary result.”59 After examining the Constitutional
Convention transcripts, the Court noted that Coleman “may have gone fur50. State v. Brackman, 582 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Mont. 1978), overruled, State v. Brown, 755 P.2d
1364 (Mont. 1988).
51. Brackman, 582 P.2d at 1220, 1222.
52. Id. at 1220.
53. State v. Hanley, 608 P.2d 104, 105–106 (Mont. 1980), overruled, Allen, 241 P.3d 1045.
54. Hanley, 608 P.2d at 109.
55. State v. Coleman, 616 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Mont. 1980), overruled, Allen, 241 P.3d 1045.
56. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1366, overruled, State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
57. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1369. In his dissent, Justice Hunt expressed that the decision was “indeed a
sad one for the citizens of the state of Montana.” Id. at 1372 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
58. State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518, 519 (Mont. 1984) (plurality).
59. Id. at 520–521.
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ther than the . . . delegates intended” and held that the video recordings
were unreasonable searches under § 10.60 The Court acknowledged:
This area of [search and seizure] law is confusing because of the numerous
approaches to the right of privacy issue in the case law. There has been unnecessary emphasis placed on distinguishing right to privacy cases from
search and seizure cases. The right to privacy is the cornerstone of protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.61

This progressive application of §§ 10 and 11, however, was not controlling
precedent.62
Thus it was not until the late 1990s that the Court fashioned a search
framework reflective of Montana’s privacy mandate and began to exhibit a
renewed effort to broaden search and seizure protections. In the 1997 electronic surveillance case State v. Siegal, the Court extended the Katz test to
include a third prong, which incorporated § 10, requiring a demonstration
of a compelling state interest for warrantless searches.63 Thereafter, the
Court applied this standard to create a heightened privacy right in numerous
search and seizure contexts including open fields,64 the automobile exception,65 search incident to arrest,66 and canine-sniff.67
The Court revisited warrantless participant monitoring in light of this
newly extended Katz test for the first time in 2008. In State v. Goetz, the
Court conducted a thorough examination of face-to-face participant monitoring jurisprudence and determined that the line of cases from the 1980s
and early 1990s was flawed.68 The Court analyzed the issue anew by employing the extended Katz test69 and held that, under the Montana Constitution, warrantless participant monitoring of a face-to-face conversation is an
unreasonable search, and is not justified by an informant’s consent.70 The
Court revisited warrantless participant monitoring two years later when it
analyzed a telephone conversation in State v. Allen.

60. Id. at 522.
61. Id.
62. “[S]ince there was not a majority of the Court addressing the protections of the Montana Constitution in Solis, it [is] not controlling precedent.” Allen, 241 P.3d at 1056.
63. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 191–192 (Mont. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, State
v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556 (Mont. 1998).
64. State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75–76 (Mont. 1995).
65. State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 470 (Mont. 2000).
66. Sate v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900, 915 (Mont. 2001).
67. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 302–303 (Mont. 2003).
68. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 504.
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STATE V. ALLEN

A. Factual and Procedural Background
After drinking at a bar in Havre, Montana, on January 27, 2008, Brian
Allen (“Allen”) asked Kristin Golie (“Golie”) to drive him to a trailer house
where they could find Louis Escobedo (“Escobedo”), whom Allen claimed
owed him money.71 Once there, Allen and Golie lured Escobedo into the
car and Allen pointed a pistol at him, demanding the money.72 When Escobedo failed to produce the money, Allen bludgeoned him with the pistol.73
During the altercation, Escobedo briefly lost consciousness, Allen allegedly
threatened to kill Golie, and Allen shot a hole through the rear window.74
Allen eventually released Escobedo, and the parties went home.75 Unbeknownst to Allen, Golie had been aiding the local drug task force in an
investigation of him.76 Without a search warrant, the task force recorded
cell phone calls between Allen and Golie, including conversations following the assault on Escobedo.77 Allen was arrested and charged with four
related felony counts of assault with a weapon and one felony count of
criminal endangerment.78
Before trial, Allen moved to suppress the warrantless telephone recordings because the task force had violated both his right of privacy and
his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Montana Constitution.79 The State opposed the motion, responding that recording the calls did not constitute a search.80 At the suppression hearing, Golie
testified she recorded calls with Allen at the behest of law enforcement and
that background noises on the call indicated Allen was in a public setting.81
Allen testified that he did not know Golie recorded their calls, that he believed the calls were private because he never heard background noises, and
that he thought he could detect whether someone was listening via speaker
phone or extension line.82 Applying the Katz test, the district court denied
Allen’s motion, concluding that no search had occurred because, although
he had a subjective expectation of privacy, society was unwilling to recog71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Allen, 241 P.3d at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1048–1049.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1049.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nize it as reasonable.83 The trial court reasoned that “a party to a telephone
conversation can never be sure who may be listening to the conversation on
the other end. . . . and that left [Allen] at risk that someone would hear them
or Golie would be recording them.”84 The State subsequently presented the
recording at trial, and the jury convicted Allen of two counts of assault with
a weapon and one count of criminal endangerment; he received a 30-year
prison sentence.85
Allen appealed his conviction to the Montana Supreme Court,86 urging
it to overrule Coleman and Brown and reexamine warrantless participant
monitoring by telephone in light of Goetz.87 The State countered that wellestablished precedent permits law enforcement to electronically monitor
telephone conversations without a warrant “so long as one party to the conversation consents, even if the consenting party is an informant.”88 The
State further argued no search occurred and, alternatively, if one did,
Golie’s consent authorized it.89
B. Majority Holding
In a 5–2 majority opinion written by Justice Leaphart, the Court reversed Allen’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.90 The Court addressed the issue of whether the district court erred when it denied Allen’s
motion to suppress the warrantless recording of his telephone conversations
with Golie.91 Agreeing with Allen, the Court concluded that “the reasoning
in Coleman was flawed and that, in light of Goetz, [the Court] should reassess [its] jurisprudence on this topic.”92 The Court then examined Coleman’s complete progeny and found the existing precedent “wanting.”93 Accordingly, the Court analyzed the issue anew, applying Montana’s extended
83. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1049.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1051.
86. Id.
87. Br. of Appellant, 31, State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010).
88. Br. of Appellee, 15, State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010).
89. Id. at 22, 35.
90. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1048.
91. Id. at 1053. There were three issues on appeal: (1) “Whether the District Court abused its
discretion when it denied Allen’s challenge for cause”; (2) “Whether the District Court erred when it
denied Allen’s motion to suppress a warrantless recording of a telephone conversation between Allen
and a confidential informant”; and (3) “Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied
Allen’s request for a jury instruction on accomplice testimony.” Id. at 1048. This note focuses solely on
the second issue.
92. Id. at 1053.
93. Id. at 1056; see also supra nn. 50–70.
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Katz test to determine whether the recordings infringed upon Allen’s constitutional rights.94
First, the Court concluded that Allen had expressed a subjective expectation of privacy that Golie was not surreptitiously recording his conversations.95 Citing Katz and Goetz, the Court stated: “The touchstone of subjective expectations of privacy is not some physical location, but rather an
individual’s desire to keep some aspect of his . . . life secure from the perception of the general public.”96 The Court reasoned that Allen sought to
preserve the privacy of his conversation with Golie because he used a telephone, he moved while conversing with her, and he limited his speech
when he passed through public areas.97 Therefore, the Court found that by
recording his conversation, law enforcement “far exceeded the degree to
which Allen knowingly exposed this conversation to the public.”98
Next, the Court concluded that society is willing to recognize as reasonable the expectation that government agents are not surreptitiously recording private cell phone conversations.99 The Court stated that the inquiry required an evaluation of Montana’s “constitutional values and
goals.”100 Consequently, it turned to the Constitutional Convention transcripts and found:
[T]he protections of the right to privacy were intended to be dynamic. Delegate Campbell introduced the right to privacy as a means of bolstering the
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by ensuring that those
protections would be able to keep pace with and not be outstripped by technological developments.101

The Court concluded that “the delegates would not have countenanced warrantless monitoring of private telephone conversations at the time they
drafted Montana’s constitution.”102 To bolster that conclusion, the Court
discussed the central role of cell phones in today’s society, noted the importance of protecting free and spontaneous discourse, and mentioned Montana’s statutory ban on surreptitiously recorded telephone conversations.103
Although contrary to Coleman and its progeny, the Court decided “the citizenry of this state would not tolerate such unrestrained government conduct
today.”104
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Allen, 241 P.3d at 1056.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1057–1058.
Id.
Id.
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1058 (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 499).
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1059.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1059–1060 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–213(1)(c) (2009)).
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1060.
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Finally, since the recording constituted a search under the Montana
Constitution, the Court considered whether the search was “justified by a
narrowly tailored, compelling state interest or subject to adequate procedural safeguards.”105 To address Golie’s consent—the only potentially applicable exception to the warrant requirement—the Court followed its own
reasoning in Goetz that when both parties are present, the consent exception
requires both parties’ consent.106 The Court concluded that in a telephone
conversation, both parties are “present” even though they are not necessarily at the same physical location.107 Since law enforcement did not obtain
Allen’s consent, recording the cell phone conversation was unreasonable
and in violation of the Montana Constitution.108 Consequently, in Montana,
law enforcement must now obtain a warrant to electronically monitor a telephone conversation between an informant and a suspect. Alternatively, law
enforcement or the informant may testify regarding a conversation in lieu of
presenting an actual recording at trial.109
C. Special Concurring Opinion
Justice Nelson concurred with the majority that the warrantless recording violated the Montana Constitution; however, he argued that because the
Katz approach to search and seizure analysis is flawed, Montana should no
longer follow it.110 After a thorough discussion of relevant federal and state
caselaw,111 Justice Nelson criticized the Katz “expectations” approach as
circular because society’s expectation of privacy is the product of what the
law allows, while the law is the product of society’s expectations.112 Next,
he asserted that it is nearly impossible to know what society accepts as
reasonable, and therefore this determination ultimately comes down to the
expectations of the individual Court members.113 He then argued that the
focus of search and seizure analysis should be on what the government is
doing rather than what society accepts as reasonable.114 Finally, he dis105. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061 (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497–498).
106. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061 (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 501–502 in turn citing Ga. v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 121–122, 126 (2006) (“the consent of a co-tenant to a search of shared premises is valid if the
other co-tenant is absent, but such consent is not valid if the other co-tenant is physically present and
objects to the search.”)).
107. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1061 n. 2.
110. Id. at 1062 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
111. Id. at 1076; see also supra nn. 39–70.
112. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1077.
113. Id. at 1078.
114. Id. at 1078–1079.
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agreed with “the proposition that the right of ‘privacy’ and the right against
unreasonable ‘searches’ are one in the same.”115
Justice Nelson proposed that “rather than engage in subjective linedrawing about . . . privacy expectations,” the Court should “apply the constitutional language according to its plain meaning.”116 He urged the Court
to adopt the new rule: “[A] search occurs where a government agent looks
over or through, explores, examines, inspects, or otherwise engages in conduct or an activity designed to find, extract, acquire, or recover evidence.”117 Then, when such a search “implicates an individual’s person,
papers, home, or effects, the government must first procure a warrant (absent an exception to the warrant requirement).”118 Justice Nelson offered
three caveats to his proposed standard. First, he would distinguish situations where the suspect knows he is speaking to a government agent from
situations where the agent’s connection to the government is kept hidden.119
Second, he did not propose that all police monitoring be outlawed, but instead that when police search according to the above definition, they must
procure a warrant, absent a recognized warrant exception.120 Finally, he
would “continue to recognize [the greater protections provided by § 10]
when conducting search analysis under § 11.”121 Under his proposed standard, Justice Nelson concluded that a search occurred in Allen because the
police “endeavor[ed] to find something (in particular, Allen’s thoughts and
communications about illegal activity).”122
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rice dissented from the majority opinion on the warrantless
recording issue.123 He argued that, by talking to Golie on the telephone
while in the presence of other people, Allen knowingly exposed his admissions about the assault and thus lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.124 Under both White and “long-standing and well-established Montana precedent,”125 Justice Rice argued the police do not violate the Mon115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1079.
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1064.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1082 (Rice, J., concurring and dissenting).
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1082.
Id.
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tana Constitution when they “electronically monitor and record telephone
conversations with the voluntary consent of one of the parties.”126
IV.

ANALYSIS

OF

STATE V. ALLEN

A. Allen Embodies a Significant and Due Expansion of
Montana’s Privacy Rights
Allen repairs inconsistencies in Montana’s jurisprudence and grants its
citizens heightened privacy. Yet considerable arguments oppose both the
consequences and reasoning of the majority opinion. Nevertheless, in
weighing governmental and individual interests, the Montana Supreme
Court correctly decided Allen because it aligns with key precedent, does not
impair law enforcement, and accurately reflects Montana’s constitutional
values and goals.
First, although it overrules thirty years of participant-monitoring precedent,127 Allen is well founded because, within Montana’s complete search
and seizure history, Coleman and its progeny are an anomaly. As discussed
above, the increased protections against governmental intrusion provided by
Allen echo the value that Montanans have placed on individual rights since
becoming a state. Allen upholds what the Court deemed the common-law
“right to be let alone” implicit in the 1889 Constitution, and it reflects the
Court’s decisions just before and just after ratification of the 1972 Constitution. The Allen opinion supports the constitutional framers’ intent for combined interpretation of §§ 10 and 11. It also aligns warrantless participant
monitoring of telephone conversations with the increased protections the
Court has provided in other search contexts since the 1990s. Most importantly, the Court employed its extended Katz test in Allen, which affords
Montanans greater protection of individual rights than those provided by
the Fourth Amendment.128
Second, although Allen’s prohibition of warrantless participant monitoring may appear to frustrate law enforcement, individual privacy interests
outweigh possible consequences for police. Proponents of police monitoring contend first, that informants need to be “wired” for their own protection,129 second, that monitoring allows police to corroborate conversations,130 and third, that recording preserves a conversation should the informant become absent.131 While these reasons explain the tactic’s utility
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1085.
Coleman, 616 P.2d at 1096.
Supra nn. 25–37, 49–69.
Brackman, 582 P.2d at 1221–1222.
Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439; Greenawalt, supra n. 38, at 212–213.
White, 401 U.S. at 753–754.
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and prevalent use,132 they do not provide sufficient justification because the
Court has not outlawed monitoring when required for safety, confirmation,
and preservation purposes.133 Police may still wire informants and record
conversations without a warrant; they simply cannot use the recordings or
other evidence obtained through such practices at trial.134 Above all, by
merely obtaining a warrant or articulating an adequate exception, law enforcement can still reap the benefits of participant monitoring and avoid
potential pitfalls.135
Finally, the Allen holding overrules long-standing precedent because,
as the majority recognized under the second prong of the extended Katz
test, Montanans are willing to recognize as reasonable Allen’s expectation
of privacy in his cell phone conversations.136 According to the Court, this
inquiry requires an examination of Montana’s “constitutional values and
goals” and “[w]e must remember in making this determination that the privacy of all people in Montana is at stake, not merely the privacy of those
people known or suspected of breaking the law.”137 As outlined below, the
arguments against finding the expectation of privacy in a telephone call
reasonable do not measure up to the Court’s current interpretation of §§ 10
and 11.
Even though the telephone facilitates eavesdropping and parties cannot
see activity on the other end,138 technology should not provide the basis
from which to measure privacy expectations.139 The telephone played a
vital role in private communications forty years ago in Katz,140 and since
then, it has evolved into a “necessary instrument[ ] for self-expression, even
self-identification.”141 As technology advances, society’s understanding of
what is reasonable in relation to its use also progresses.142 The claim that
the telephone deprives an individual of his privacy expectations undermines
the present-day meaning of free and spontaneous discourse.143 The Court
in Allen properly determined that the Montana Constitution demonstrates a
132. Id. at 770 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Greenawalt, supra n. 38, at 211–212.
133. White, 401 U.S. at 782 n. 19.
134. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061.
135. Rarely in warrantless participant monitoring cases has there been insufficient time or other
exigent circumstances that prevented law enforcement from first obtaining a warrant. See e.g. Brown,
755 P.2d at 1372 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
136. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061.
137. Id. at 1058.
138. Id. at 1049, 1060.
139. Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 837, 902 (1998).
140. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
141. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1059 (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010)).
142. Bast, supra n. 139, at 902.
143. Id. at 900–902.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in private communication, which is “in
no way limited to face-to-face conversations and logically extends to [the]
telephone.”144
Although the use of informants is not an unconstitutional practice,145
and an individual does not know what another might “do” with his words
once he verbalizes his thoughts, the mere fact that an individual risked the
repetition of his words does not render his expectation of privacy unreasonable per se. “The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others.”146 If an individual chooses to converse
with a friend, family member, or cohort, an uninvited ear greatly exceeds
what he knowingly chose to expose. The same is true of a recording, which
is far more damaging at trial than an informant’s live testimony, which is
limited by fallible memory and subject to credibility challenges.147 No reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations would allow for unimpeded
electronic monitoring simply because individuals choose to communicate.
In a society with rapidly-advancing technology, the possibility of such
widespread monitoring contravenes the “greater protections against governmental intrusions” that Montanans have come to enjoy.148
Regardless of an individual’s desire to engage in criminal activity, he
is nevertheless entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private
communications. The argument for warrantless participant monitoring
based on a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy for wrongdoers149
presumes that all individuals are guilty of criminal activity. Applying this
standard, law enforcement could monitor any telephone call. This argument “turns the presumption of innocence on its head.”150 The rights of
privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures protect the
guilty as well as the innocent.151 As the Court appropriately stated in Allen,
“our presumption must be that persons conversing on phones are doing so
legitimately and thus they have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”152

144. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1058–1059.
145. White, 401 U.S. at 751–752.
146. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 198 (1890).
147. White, 401 U.S. at 787–789 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 790; Allen, 241 P.3d at 1079 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (quoting State v. Graham,
175 P.3d 885, 888 (2007)).
149. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (majority).
150. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1060 (majority).
151. White, 401 U.S. at 789–790 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1060.
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B. Search Analysis in Montana Must Continue to Include
the § 10 Right of Privacy
“[Reasonable] men simply cannot agree on what is an unreasonable
search.”153 In his special concurrence, Justice Nelson suggested that Montana abandon Katz when analyzing search cases and proposed an alternative
test based on the plain-meaning of the word “search.”154 While his proposed plain meaning test has merit, it falls short because it fails to explicitly
incorporate Montana’s heightened-privacy mandate.
Justice Nelson is not alone in opining that the Katz test is insufficient,
and his proposed plain meaning test has some positive attributes. For forty
years, legal scholars have criticized the Katz test as circular, imprecise, inadequate for determining society’s actual privacy expectations, and illadapted to respond to technological advances.155 Even Justice Harlan expressed misgivings about his concurring opinion’s two-part test.156 As for
Justice Nelson’s proposed alternative to Katz, satisfactory plain meaning
tests are common in search and seizure law—courts have had few difficulties identifying an unreasonable seizure based on its plain meaning definition.157 With the myriad of factors presented by search cases,158 a brightline rule focusing on the government’s activity, rather than the interests
protected, seems favorable. Additionally, Justice Nelson’s test reflects a
heightened standard, which would presumably increase protections against
unreasonable searches.
But despite Katz’s inadequacies and the merits of a plain meaning test,
the Montana Supreme Court should be cautious of abandoning its extended
Katz test. The Katz test has been accepted precedent for more than forty
years. It is applicable to all search contexts159 and is grounded in principles
153. LaFave, supra n. 3, at 255 (quoting James R. Thompson, Illinois Search and Seizure Law—The
New Frontier, 11 DePaul L. Rev. 27 (1961)).
154. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1079 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
155. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment,
1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 133 (1968); Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 Yale
L.J. 1461 (1976–1977); Michael Campbell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 191 (1986); Rex R. Perschbacher, Welcoming Remarks: “Katz v. U.S.: 40 Years Later”, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 775 (2008); Christian M.
Halliburton, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom and Fourth Amendment Fidelity, 59 Hastings L.J. 309 (2007).
156. Elison & NettikSimmons, supra n. 30, at 23.
157. A seizure requires “some meaningful interference with an individual’s liberty or possessory
interests.” Thomas M. Finnegan, Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 74 Geo. L.J. 499, 509 (1986).
158. Warrantless participant monitoring cases, for example, require consideration of the relationship
of the parties, location of the conversation, intent of the informant, method of monitoring, and use of the
transmission or recording. Greenawalt, supra n. 38, at 223–225.
159. Harrison & Mickelson, supra n. 29, at 250.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013

17

Montana Law Review, Vol. 73 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-1\MON102.txt

196

unknown

Seq: 18

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

9-APR-12

14:08

Vol. 73

that adapt to societal change.160 After finding the Katz test necessary but
insufficient, the Court appropriately extended it to reflect § 10.161 Since
that extension, the Court has consistently used it to increase individual
rights and effectively diverge from federal doctrine. As Justice Nelson astutely noted: “[T]here is no distinct ‘search’ analysis under Montana
law . . . . Yet there should be.”162 For Montana to avoid federal scrutiny
and honor its own constitution and laws, the Court needs a fully independent analysis for determining whether particular police practices are
searches as contemplated by the Montana Constitution.163 Admittedly, the
extended Katz test is based on a federal standard, but with its third prong it
provides independent state grounds for the Court’s decisions. Justice Nelson’s test, on the other hand, reflects only the language of § 11, which is
nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Without explicit analysis under
§ 10, future search decisions based on the plain-meaning test may be susceptible to federal review.164
Furthermore, the Court should be reticent to adopt Justice Nelson’s
plain meaning test as it stands. Justice Nelson said he would “recognize”
§ 10 when conducting a search analysis under § 11;165 however, he did not
define a rule for such a recognition. While the implication of “papers,
homes, and effects”166 could equate to privacy interests, the Montana Constitution contains an explicit right of privacy. Thus, articulating an implicit
privacy right within the search and seizure provision is unnecessary and
may be unduly burdensome.167 Moreover, Justice Nelson proclaims: “[I]t is
160. Matlach, supra n. 38, at 422 at 423.
161. “[T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other
people—is . . . left largely to the law of the individual States.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–351.
162. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1078 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
163. Elison & NettikSimmons, supra n. 30, at 21–24; David M. Skover, Address: State Constitutional Law Interpretation: Out of “Lock-Step” and Beyond “Reactive” Decisionmaking, 51 Mont. L.
Rev. 243, 252 (1990).
164. State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 256 (Mont. 1983) (on remand from the United States Supreme
Court, whether prior judgment was based on federal or state constitutional grounds, or both), overruling
recognized by, State v. Schneider, 197 P.3d 1020, 1025 (Mont. 2008) (when analyzing parallel provisions between the U.S. and Montana Constitutions, the Court must conduct an independent review by
looking to the text’s plain meaning, the legislative intent, relevant state precedent, and finally, federal
precedent to avoid marching lock-step with the United States Supreme Court). “More than any other
case, Jackson demonstrated . . . that a state court must expressly disavow even casual reliance on federal
law if the integrity of a state judgment is to be respected by the Court.” Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance
on State Constitutions—the Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1095, 1107 (1985).
165. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1079.
166. Id. at 1064 (quoting Mont. Const. art. II, § 11).
167. See generally Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?,
1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215 (1989). The author discusses various interpretive approaches taken by those
states with explicit state constitutional privacy provisions and advocates for state court recognition and
reliance on those independent provisions.
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error to treat [§§ 10 and 11] as creating just one single right of privacy.”168
But it is also error to treat them as completely separate. Since the late
1800s, privacy has become the cornerstone of search analysis,169 and
Montanans have adamantly demonstrated in the face of invasive practices
that they “cherish their privacy.”170 Even though the Montana Constitution
treats search and privacy rights under separate sections, the provisions
should be interpreted together.171 Removing privacy from search analysis
undermines the framers’ intent to grant the privacy right “unquestioned
constitutional significance”172 and narrows Montana’s constitutional protections against governmental intrusion.
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court took an important step toward protecting
Montanans’ privacy rights in State v. Allen. The Court, in holding that warrantless participant monitoring is an unlawful search prohibited by the
Montana Constitution, used Montana’s independent privacy clause to grant
greater protection to its citizens than is provided by the Fourth Amendment.
This decision rectified faulty state caselaw and aligned monitoring jurisprudence with state constitutional intent. Without greatly frustrating law enforcement, it represents an accurate and contemporary interpretation of
Montana’s constitutional rights. Most importantly, it declares Montanans’
expectation of privacy in telephone calls reasonable and private conversations deserving of constitutional protection.
While the plain meaning search test proposed by Justice Nelson is
noteworthy, its lack of an explicit § 10 analysis renders it incomplete. But
search tests proposed in concurring opinions have been known to become
the seminal standard,173 and if Montana is truly a guardian of heightened
individual rights, it must establish its own distinct analyses. Therefore,
should the Court choose to follow Justice Nelson’s suggestion and establish
a heightened standard based on fully-independent state grounds, the Court
must broaden the plain meaning test with a provision expressly reflective of
Montana’s constitutional privacy mandate. Only by retaining a privacy-enhanced search and seizure analysis may the Court achieve both independent
state grounds for providing greater protection to Montanans and a properly
construed individual right of privacy.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Allen, 241 P.3d at 1069.
Supra nn. 19–20, 34–35, 41–46, 50–52, 58–70, 146.
Rava, supra n. 30, at 1716.
Supra nn. 30–37.
Elison & NettikSimmons, supra n. 30, at 1.
See e.g. Justice Harlan’s “Katz test.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2013

19

Montana Law Review, Vol. 73 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-1\MON102.txt

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol73/iss1/7

unknown

Seq: 20

9-APR-12

14:08

20

